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Abstract  
We conduct an artefactual field experiment in which 164 managers and senior advisors 
recruited from Swedish industry were presented with a task of maximizing net revenue from 
abatement investments under three different but equally stringent environmental policy 
regimes. We find that investment decisions are strongly influenced by type of policy instrument. 
Economic instruments and performance standards cause different attentional and judgment 
biases that are inconsistent with standard economic theory. Inconsistencies are larger with 
economic policy instruments (tax and subsidy) than with performance standards even though 
subjects’ attention to cost minimization was greater with economic instruments than under 
performance standards.  
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According to standard economic theory, a profit-maximizing, or cost-minimizing, firm should 
equate the values of marginal product and marginal cost. In the presence of an environmental 
economic policy, such as the Pigovian emissions tax, this implies choosing the emissions level 
at which the firm’s marginal abatement cost of reducing its emissions is equal to the emissions 
tax level. This result, which guarantees cost-efficient emissions reductions, is a cornerstone in 
the mainstream economics literature arguing for the use of economic policy instruments (such 
as taxes, subsidies, or tradable permits) rather than standards.1  
Still, despite its powerful theoretical prediction, empirical evidence suggests that under some 
circumstances, decisions in response to policy deviate from standard theory (for an overview, 
see, e.g., Sorrell, Mallett and Nye 2011). A prominent example of such deviation from theory 
is the “energy efficiency gap,” which refers to empirical observations that realized energy 
efficiency investments seem to diverge from the cost-minimizing level. Allcott and Greenstone 
(2012) provide a comprehensive review of the existence of the energy efficiency gap and 
suggest that that there is substantial heterogeneity in investment inefficiencies across different 
types of agents. They further outline a number of causes of these investment inefficiencies, such 
as imperfect information and behavioral constraints (e.g., inattention to information), though 
most of the discussion is framed within a consumer perspective. When it comes to firm 
behavior, according to standard economic theory, competition should force firms with 
investment inefficiencies out of business in the long run. In terms of productivity, the 
probability of a firm exiting the market is higher the lower its productivity. Yet, there are well 
documented and persistent empirical differences in productivity even within narrowly defined 
businesses and industries (for an overview, see Syverson 2011). Explaining empirical 
productivity differences has attracted strong interest from economists, and one factor that has 
received attention is the potential importance of management. For instance, Bloom et al. (2013) 
show that under certain circumstances, informational constraints and restrictions on competitive 
pressure can allow “badly run” firms to stay in business. 
Our study contributes to this field of research by conducting an artefactual field experiment on 
firm behavior in response to policy interventions (see Harrison and List 2004 for a taxonomy 
of experimental approaches). The overall purpose is to test whether heterogeneity in investment 
inefficiencies could arise as a result of the type of policy instrument implemented as well as 
complex choice situations in which managers and senior advisors (“the firm”) may be subject 
                                                            
1 Note that a regulator with perfect information about the firms’ abatement costs could achieve the cost-efficient 
allocation by setting firm-specific performance standards based on individual marginal cost functions.  
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to bounded rationality or rely on norms or simplified choice rules that conflict with standard 
theory. The research builds on empirical evidence of behavioral anomalies and recent literature 
that emphasizes the need to consider behavioral economics and bounded rationality in the 
design and analysis of environmental policy (see, e.g., Shogren 2002; Shogren and Taylor 2008; 
Gowdy 2008; Gsottbauer and van den Bergh 2010; Pollitt and Shaorshadze 2011; Carlsson and 
Johansson-Stenman 2012; Gsottbauer 2013).  
The aim of the experimental design is to test whether differences in firm managers’ responses 
and attention to information result from equally stringent policy instruments and to analyze 
which choice rules managers and advisors adhere to in complex investment choice situations 
(including the choice rule that would correspond to standard economic theory). We recruited 
164 firm managers and senior advisors from Swedish industry and randomly assigned each of 
them to one of three policy instrument treatments—tax, subsidy, or performance standards—
all with equal stringency in terms of social efficiency. We asked them to choose the abatement 
investment level that would maximize the net revenue of a hypothetical firm (with an identical 
cost structure in all treatments).  
The experiment was designed such that subjects were presented with both redundant and 
relevant numerical information for making the investment choice. However, to mimic real-
world complex decision making, the provided information did not allow subjects to base the 
choice merely on numerical calculations. Instead, they needed to rely on non-numerical 
information to choose an investment alternative maximizing net revenue. For instance, in the 
tax treatment,  the set of information variables was arranged so that only one investment 
alternative had a marginal cost equating the tax level. Hence, this alternative corresponded to 
the optimality condition according to standard economic theory.  
The rationale for assigning subjects to different treatments with equally stringent policies is that 
the policies inherently rely on different types of information variables (price versus 
performance). Economic instruments and performance standards could therefore draw the 
attention of firm managers to different types of information. The theoretical and experimental 
behavioral economics literature has revealed several judgment biases that arise in situations 
where one information attribute is more salient to decision makers than others. For example, 
the dissociation between monetary assessments and predicted utility is one well-known 
judgment anomaly (see, e.g., Thaler 1985; Hsee et al. 2003; Amir, Ariely, and Carmon 2008). 
Evidence also suggests that monetary assessments tend to make decision makers focus more on 
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information variables related to transactions (for instance, prices, costs, and market norms) and 
less on other variables related to the pleasure or utility of owning or consuming the good.  
Amir, Ariely, and Carmon (2008) suggest that this can be explained by focalism, meaning that 
different assessment tasks are informed by different types of information and features of the 
evaluated stimuli. They find experimental support for this conjecture by testing the impact of 
different types of information on subjects’ value assessments. By drawing subjects’ attention 
to either a monetary variable (production cost) or other attribute variables, they find a disparity 
between the subjects’ willingness to pay and the predicted utility. Schkade and Kahneman 
(1998) show that decision makers’ evaluations of changes are affected by the information 
emphasized. Finally, preference reversals may occur when choices become more informed by 
the most prominent attribute of the evaluated options; this is known as the prominence effect 
(Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic 1988).2  
In addition, the psychology literature suggests that decision makers may fail to engage in cost-
benefit analyses and instead rely on decision-by-rules mechanisms learned through experience 
or social exchange (Simonson 1989; Prelec and Herrnstein 1991; Shafir, Simonson, and 
Tversky 1993). Amir and Ariely (2007) show in an experiment that the need for monetary 
assessments may invoke previously learned rules, resulting in inconsistency between monetary-
based judgments and judgments based on other factors such as effort and pleasure. Further, 
Sunstein (2004) argues that the context of the decision may activate the switch from maximizing 
preferences to instead applying a certain choice rule. 
There are still very few examples of studies specifically on firm behavior in the behavioral and 
experimental economics literature. Ellison (2006) and Spiegler (2011) discuss bounded 
rationality in the decision-making process within industrial organization. Camerer and 
Malmendier (2007) consider the possibility that top managers make mistakes that markets do 
not fully correct. They argue that managers are most likely to face judgment biases when (i) a 
certain type of decision is not made frequently and does not deliver clear feedback, (ii) the 
manager does not specialize in making the specific type of decision, and (iii) the manager is 
protected from market pressure and competition. All three cases are examples of what may 
occur when the feedback signals from the market are imperfect or infrequent. To explain 
deviations from profit maximization in firms, Armstrong and Huck (2010) and Cyert and March 
                                                            
2 A preference reversal occurs when a subject prefers one alternative in one response mode (e.g., choice) but 
exhibits the opposite preference order in another response mode (e.g., a rating over an attribute). 
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(1963) refer to satisficing, a concept developed by Simon (1955). Satisficing as an example of 
bounded rationality suggests that a decision maker generally does not go through and compare 
all universally possible investment choices, but rather chooses the first option that he or she 
deems satisfying.3 Alternatively, firm managers may rely on rules of thumb, such as imitating 
strategies of well-performing rivals or changing strategies only when profits fall below some 
acceptable threshold rather than performing explicit calculations of optimal strategies 
(Armstrong and Huck 2010). 
In the context of the current study, our results show that the investment decisions of firm 
managers and senior advisors are strongly and significantly influenced by type of policy 
instrument. Moreover, treatments induce significant attentional biases in subjects’ stated use of 
information for making their decisions. We argue that these effects occur because economic 
policy instruments and standards naturally invoke two different assessment approaches—
monetary-based and performance-based judgments—leading to different attentional and 
judgmental biases that are inconsistent with the expected outcome in standard economic theory. 
These inconsistencies were larger with economic instruments than with performance standards 
even though managers’ attention to abatement costs and to the minimization of those costs were 
found to be greater with economic instruments than under performance standards. These 
investment inefficiencies are remarkable given that our subjects are managers and senior 
investment advisors from large and medium-size firms who have experience with real 
investment decisions in response to both economic policy instruments and performance 
standards in Sweden. The prevalence of such effects presents a challenge to policy researchers 
as well as regulators in their choice and design of policy instruments and is of importance and 
concern in relation to economic policy in general. 
 
I. Survey Design and Experimental Manipulations 
 
A. Population and participants  
                                                            
3 The reliance of decision makers on simplified decision rules for cognitively demanding tasks has received 
much attention in the literature on bounded rationality (Simon 1955, 1979). The term refers to the limited 
capacity for rationality that can arise when solving complex problems, processing large amounts of information, 
or making decisions in the presence of uncertainty and incomplete information. 
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Experienced managers and senior advisors were recruited for the experiment from large and 
medium-size firms in Swedish industry. Their ordinary work duties involve analyzing and 
preparing technical and economic background information for investment decisions and 
recommending decisions to the firm’s CEO or board of directors. The subject pool was 
identified through the Swedish regulatory register of plants classified as engaging in 
environmentally hazardous activities (EHA) by the Swedish Environmental Code.4  Typically, 
the EHA classification is given only to plants larger than a certain size, which is usually 
determined by production volume. The EHA category implies that our sample represents large 
and medium-size firms, including the largest firms in Sweden. We therefore expect managers 
and senior advisors in our sample to be among the most experienced in Swedish industry. 
Moreover, each regulated plant in the EHA category is generally regulated by various types of 
policy instruments, including the Swedish Environmental Code, as well as economic policy 
instruments, such as the Swedish NOx charge, the Swedish CO2 tax, and the CO2 emissions 
trading system EU ETS. Hence, our subjects generally have broad experience with various 
types of economic policy instruments and standards. 
All EHA-registered firms in the chemical, pulp and paper, and steel sectors, as well as all firms 
operating combustion plants for production of electricity and heat in Sweden, were included in 
the sample pool. Altogether, 385 firms were identified. For the pilot study, 54 firms were 
randomly drawn from the total of 385 firms, and for the final experiment, the remaining 331 
firms on the list were contacted by phone in February and March 2014. Within each firm, a 
search for the manager or senior advisor in charge of environmental investment decisions was 
conducted. In 52 firms (16 percent), neither the manager nor the senior advisor with said 
responsibilities was reached after three phone calls (for reasons such as meetings, traveling, or 
parental leave). In 34 firms (10 percent), a target subject was reached by phone but declined to 
participate. In 245 firms (74 percent), either a manager or a senior advisor was identified and 
agreed to participate. Upon acceptance, subjects were informed that a link to an online 
questionnaire would be sent by e-mail within 24 hours after the call. After up to three reminders 
by phone and e-mail, 164 subjects (57 percent), of whom 69 were managers and 95 were senior 
advisors, had completed the experiment. Among the 69 managers, 39 were members of the 
firm’s senior management team.  
                                                            
4 The Swedish regulatory register is Svenska miljörapporteringsportalen (SMP). The declaration data used is 
reviewed by the Swedish Environmental Emissions Data (Svenska Miljö Emissions Data, SMED) on behalf of 
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. 
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B. Incentives and treatments 
The subjects received the online survey via e-mail with the stated aim of “better understanding 
the effects of environmental regulations on firms’ investments in cleaner technologies.” The 
subjects were never informed in phone calls, e-mails, or the online survey that they were 
participating in an experiment or that there were different treatments (see Appendix A.1 for 
more details on the recruitment process). 
In the experiment, subjects were presented with six investment alternatives that differed in 
terms of abatement level and cost. They were instructed to choose the investment alternative 
that would yield the highest net revenue for a hypothetical firm. The choices made by the 
subjects were incentivized, yet the incentives in terms of relative monetary payoff were low in 
relation to the high monthly earnings of the subjects. However, studies have shown that the size 
of the stake does not have a significant effect on qualitative outcomes (e.g., in public goods 
experiments such as Kocher, Martinsson and Visser (2008). Rather, it is the move from 
unincentivized to incentivized choices that matters. For practical reasons, we incentivized this 
experiment using cinema tickets (see Appendix A.6 for details). The cinema tickets were easy 
to transfer via e-mail to the subjects (this would not have been the case had the payments been 
made with the corresponding amount of money). No time limits were imposed for completing 
the experiment and ex-post questionnaire, and it took each subject on average 15 minutes to 
complete the full survey (see Appendix A.6 for the full survey). 
The subjects were randomized into the three treatments described in Table 1.5  
Table 1. Policy instrument treatments 
Treatment Regulator’s information 
Performance standard The condition for your investment decision is that the firm should meet an 
emissions limit of 75 grams per kWh output on an annual average basis according 
to the Swedish Environmental Code. 
Tax The condition for your investment decision is that the firm will pay an emissions tax 
of SEKa 250 per kg of emissions each year. 
Subsidy The condition for your investment decision is that the firm will receive a subsidy of 
SEKa 250 per kg emissions reduction each year. 
                                                            
5 Experimental economics has been criticized by experimenters in other disciplines, such as psychology and 
political science, for failing to study control groups (Green and Shapiro 1994; Jones 1999a, b). The common 
defense is that the theoretical prediction of the rational choice serves as the objective comparison (from the 
experimental design point of view), or control. Since we are primarily interested in the behavioral response to 
economic incentives, we impose an alternative hypothesis, as control or benchmark, in the form of a performance 





The experiment was designed such that the stringencies of the three policy instruments were 
identical, and the only difference between the treatments was the sentence containing the 
regulatory information in Table 1.6 (The formal optimization problems with optimal conditions 
for each treatment are shown in Appendix A.2.) 
Shifting from performance standards to an economic instrument will, besides introducing 
economic incentives, introduce distributive effects. Studies have shown that people put more 
negative weight on a loss than they put positive weight on a similar-size gain (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Goldberg and von Nitzsch 2001). To control for 
any reference dependencies, including loss aversion, we included a subsidy (negative tax) 
treatment to serve as an exact mirror of the (positive) tax treatment.  
The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three treatments in Table 1. Of the 164 
subjects who completed the experiment, 52 were assigned to the tax treatment, 45 to the subsidy 
treatment, and 67 to the performance standard treatment. The average subject was 49 years old 
and had 14 years of work experience in the current position (manager or senior advisor). Fifty-
two percent of the subjects were male. The subjects in the tax treatment differ significantly from 
the other subjects in a few variables. (This is discussed further in Appendix A.3.) 
C. Information and choice set 
The investment alternatives were presented using three different categories of information: 
1. regulatory information about the stringency and type of policy instrument in place 
(varies across treatments; see Table 1); 
2. emissions performance levels, grams of emissions per kilowatt hours of output (g/kWh) 
for each of the six investment alternatives (identical across treatments); and 
3. total, average, and marginal costs of the six investment alternatives (identical across 
treatments) 
                                                            
6 Note that we did not include any penalty in the performance standard treatment. It is uncommon in Sweden to 
immediately impose a fixed penalty for a firm that suddenly violates an emissions limit value. If a firm is found 
in violation, authorities communicate with the firm, resulting in an analysis of the cause and a joint plan for how 
the firm will comply with the rules. 
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The investment alternatives were presented to the subjects in the form of a choice set containing 
information categories 2 and 3 (see Table 2). The choice set contained six different investment 
(abatement) levels, A through F, with varying emissions performance and abatement costs. The 
columns show investment alternatives A–F, and the rows provide information about outcomes 
in terms of the emissions performance and costs associated with each alternative.7  
Table 2. Choice set with information variables in all treatments (information categories II and III) 
 Alt A Alt B Alt C Alt D Alt E Alt F 
Emissions performance (g/kWh) 95 90 85 80 75 70 
Total annual investment cost (SEK) 21,250 25,000 31,250 40,000 51,250 65,000 
Marginal cost of abatement (SEK/kg) 50 100 150 200 250 300 
Average cost of abatement (SEK/kg) 430 250 210 200 210 220 
  
Immediately after making the investment choice, while still seeing the choice set in Table 2 on 
the computer screen, subjects were asked to grade, on a six-item Likert scale, how relevant each 
information variable was for their choice. In the experiment, all alternatives except C included 
information attributes with different minima or maxima. 
The set of information variables in Table 2, identical in all treatments, was designed to mimic 
real-world complex decision making in that subjects were presented with redundant as well as 
relevant but insufficient numerical information for investment choice based on numerical 
calculations. Instead, subjects needed to rely on other than merely numerical information to 
pick an investment alternative that would maximize net revenue. For instance, in the tax 
treatment, the set of information variables was arranged such that alternative E was the unique 
alternative with a marginal cost of 250 SEK/kg, which equals the tax level in the tax treatment 
and the subsidy level in the subsidy treatment. Assuming continuously differentiable cost 
functions in line with standard economic theory, this alternative corresponds to the choice that 
maximizes net revenue. Accordingly, this alternative is the rational choice in standard economic 
theory (see Appendix A.2 for optimal conditions). Failing to take this information into account 
and choosing an alternative other than E would give rise to investment inefficiencies in terms 
of standard economic theory.   
                                                            
7 The minimum average cost, where marginal cost equals average cost, is found in alternative D. The production 
volume is assumed to be constant across A–F, implying that cost minimization will straightforwardly also 
maximize net revenue.  
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Hence, the experimental design allows a subject, aware of the optimal condition in standard 
economic theory, to identify the alternative that maximizes net revenue as the one where the 
marginal cost equals the tax rate (or the subsidy rate in the subsidy treatment). If subjects use 
this “optimal rule,” the problem is straightforward. For instance, in the tax treatment, the subject 
identifies the marginal cost as the relevant information. Second, the subject compares each 
alternative in the list until he or she finds one that has (or comes closest to) the marginal cost 
of 250 SEK/kg in alternative E. After finding this, the subject continues to check all remaining 
alternatives, verifying that E is unique among all alternatives. The information about total cost, 
average cost, and emissions performance is redundant.  
In the performance standard treatment, the alternative with an emissions performance of 75 
grams per kWh output in alternative E fulfills the standard at the lowest marginal cost (by 
constrained maximization). Thus, the rational subject first identifies E and F as the permissible 
alternatives, and then chooses (now under the binding constraint) from them the alternative with 
the lowest marginal cost, which is again E, with the marginal cost of 250 SEK/kg (for optimal 
conditions with binding constraints see Appendix A.2). The information about total cost and 
average cost is redundant as in the other treatments. 
In the experiment, we intentionally avoided placing the investment alternative with information 
corresponding to maximized net revenue in standard economic theory close to the middle of 
the choice set in Table 2 because several sources in the experimental literature show that 
individuals tend to opt for an intermediate—that is, a compromise alternative—instead of an 
extreme alternative, in particular when faced with a range of possibly non-dominated 
alternatives (Simonson 1989; Simonson and Tversky 1992; Tversky and Simonson 1993). We 
also avoided placing the investment alternative with information corresponding to maximized 
net revenue at one extreme of the choice set because of the possibility of order dependence. 
Although a rational decision maker’s choice is order independent, meaning that any 
permutation of the order in which alternatives are presented will not affect the choice, bounded 
rationality may result in order dependence. Salant (2011) shows that any choice rule that is 
procedurally simpler than rational choice is order dependent. Hence, the order of the 
alternatives presented to the decision maker may affect choice behavior. The order effect is 
easily demonstrated; for example, in the satisficing procedure described by Simon (1955), the 
decision maker assigns each alternative as either satisfactory or not and chooses the first 
satisfactory alternative. If no alternative is satisfactory, the last alternative is chosen (Simon 
1955). Hence, a satisficing decision maker displays order effects. Thus, placing a satisfactory 
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alternative toward the beginning of the list of alternatives increases the likelihood that it will be 
chosen (primacy effect), and so does placing a nonsatisfactory alternative in the last position 
(recency effect).  
II. Results 
We now turn to the analysis of the experimental data. First, we test for treatment effects—that 
is, whether the subjects’ investment choices are influenced by the type of policy instrument, 
and whether we can reject or accept the prediction of the standard economic theory of no 
difference in investment choices across treatments. Second, we test whether the type of policy 
instrument affects subjects’ attention to the different information attributes. Third, we analyze 
whether investment inefficiencies, in terms of standard economic theory, can be explained by 
bounded rationality and attentional biases in information reliance. Finally, we discuss welfare 
implications of the results. 
A. Treatment effects 
Figure 1 provides a qualitative illustration of the frequencies of observed choices and stated 
information relevance across policy treatments.  (A quantitative overview of frequencies and 
means is found in Appendix A.4.)  
Figure 1. Investment choice by treatment (bubble size is proportional to the frequency in each treatment)  
 
Figure 1 shows clear evidence of treatment effects on investment levels (note that abatement 
increases from A to F; that is, investment choice A corresponds to the smallest emissions 
reduction and F to the largest).8 In the performance standard treatment, alternatives E and F are 
more frequent choices than in the economic policy treatments. A comparison of the investment 
levels in the economic policy treatments (tax and subsidy) with those in the performance 
standard treatment reveals that the investment levels under any of the economic instruments are 
                                                            
8 Here we refer to the “total annual investment cost,” which is monotonically increasing in choices A–F. 
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significantly lower than under the performance standard.9 In the performance standard 
treatment, 88 percent of the subjects chose alternative E or F (E and F are the only two choices 
that comply with the standard). About 40 percent chose alternative E, which has a marginal cost 
that equals the tax and subsidy levels. In the tax and subsidy treatments, only 3.9 and 8.9 
percent, respectively, chose E. The most commonly chosen alternative in the tax and subsidy 
treatments was instead alternative D (46 and 33 percent of the subjects, respectively). (Tables 
A.4.1–A.4.3 in Appendix A.4 give quantitative overviews of frequencies per treatment.) 
We conclude that the observed choices are not consistent with the prediction of standard 
economic theory that the choices should not differ across treatments. We also see indications 
of investment inefficiencies in all treatments (i.e., choices that fail to take into account the 
optimal conditions in alternative E). Replacing performance standards with an economic 
instrument reveals another striking result. The average response time for making the choice 
increased by 52 and 91 percent in the tax and subsidy treatments, respectively, compared with 
the performance standards. The difference in response time is significant in a Mann-Whitney 
test,10 which suggests that the cognitive complexity indeed increased with economic 
instruments compared with performance standards.  
To control for reference dependencies when switching from performance standards to taxes, we 
introduced a subsidy (negative tax) with stringency identical to that for the tax treatment. A 
comparison reveals that the average investment level is slightly lower with the subsidy than 
with the tax, which possibly indicates such dependencies. However, a Mann-Whitney test 
shows that the difference is not significant. 
B. The effect of policy instrument on subjects’ attention to information 
Immediately after making their choices in the experiment, subjects were asked to rate the 
relevance of each information variable in the choice set (information categories 2 and 3) for the 
choice of investment made. The subjects’ responses reveal that their decisions were 
significantly influenced by the type of policy instrument (see Figure 2). In the two economic 
policy treatments, subjects ranked the relevance of the information on emissions performance 
significantly lower than did subjects in the performance standard treatment, and the relevance 
                                                            
9 Tax vs. performance standard: Mann-Whitney U-test, mean vs. mean, p = 0.0000. Subsidy vs. performance 
standard: Mann-Whitney U-test, mean vs. mean, p = 0.0000. 
10 Tax vs. performance standard: Mann-Whitney U-test, mean vs. mean, p = 0.0050. Subsidy vs. performance 
standard: Mann-Whitney U-test, mean vs. mean, p = 0.0035. 
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of costs information was ranked significantly higher than the relevance of the emissions 
performance information (within-comparison).11 Subjects in both the tax and the subsidy 
treatments on average ranked information about the average cost of abatement as the most 
relevant information for the investment choice made. In the performance standard treatment, 
the emissions performance information was instead ranked highest (within-comparison; all are 
statistically significantly different from the information that in each treatment is ranked as the 
second most important).12  
Figure 2. Stated relevance of information types by treatment (bubble size is proportional to frequency)  
 
While information about total annual investment cost is ranked as important in all three 
treatments (no significant difference among the treatments),13 marginal cost is ranked as the 
least important information in the subsidy and performance standard treatments,14 and it is 
ranked as the second least important information in the tax treatment (within-comparison).15 It 
                                                            
11 Tax vs. performance standard: Mann-Whitney U-test, mean vs. mean, p = 0.0000. Subsidy vs. performance 
standard: Mann-Whitney U-test, mean vs. mean, p = 0.0000. 
12 Wilcoxon signed-rank test: Tax treatment test if information about average cost (median) is equal to the median 
of the information about investment cost, p = 0.0968. Subsidy treatment test if information about average cost 
(median) is equal to the median of the information about investment cost, p = 0.0693. Performance standard 
treatment test if information about emissions performance (median) is equal to the median of the information about 
investment cost, p = 0.0000. 
13 Mann-Whitney U-test, mean vs. mean: tax vs. subsidy treatment: p = 0.6438; tax vs. performance standard 
treatment: p = 0.9226; subsidy vs. performance standard treatment: p = 0.4910. 
14 However, it is only significantly different from the second least important information, as ranked by subjects, in 
the performance standard treatment. 
15 But it is not significantly different from information ranked as least important in the tax treatment, the emissions 
performance information. Wilcoxon signed-rank test: Tax treatment test if information about marginal cost 
(median) is equal to the median of the information about emissions performance, p = 0.7676. Subsidy treatment 
test if information about marginal cost (median) is equal to the median of the information about emissions 
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should be noted, however, that marginal cost information is deemed significantly more 
important in the tax and subsidy treatments than in the performance standard treatment 
(between-comparison).16  
Clearly, the policy treatments draw subjects’ attention to either a monetary variable (a tax or a 
subsidy level) or a performance variable (emissions limit value). One may ask if these 
attentional biases can also explain the differences in investment choice between the economic 
policy treatments and performance standard treatments. In the case of performance standards, 
only 40 percent of the subjects succeeded in choosing alternative E, which has the lowest cost 
(across all cost variables) among complying investment alternatives (constrained 
maximization). Their focus on emissions performance may have caused them to underweight 
cost information, thus failing to choose alternative E even though this is a simpler task, as fewer 
(complying) alternatives exist than in the treatments with economic instruments, where all 
alternatives in the choice set are compliable. Thus, the performance-based judgment (in the 
performance standard treatment) seems to divert attention from the monetary attributes required 
for identifying cost-efficient investment levels by constrained maximization. When firms do 
not respond by (constrained) maximization under standard regimes, the total cost inefficiency 
under standards may be even larger than the usual inefficiency from not exploiting the 
heterogeneity in abatement costs within the industry.  
In the case of economic policy instruments, however, subjects’ attention is significantly drawn 
toward cost information variables, but apparently not sufficiently to lead them to choose 
investment alternative E, which constitutes the optimal condition of a marginal cost that equals 
the tax and subsidy level. Instead, the most commonly chosen alternative in the tax and subsidy 
treatments was alternative D (46 percent and 33 percent of the subjects, respectively), which is 
consistent with the choice rule that minimizes the average cost across investment (abatement 
cost) alternatives rather than the total cost to the firm (the sum of abatement cost and compliance 
cost), as in alternative E. The attentional bias now occurs between different types of cost 
information rather than between cost and performance information as in the performance 
standard treatment. A majority of subjects exhibited behavior that is consistent with minimizing 
average cost across alternatives in the choice set. Consequently, they minimized abatement cost 
                                                            
performance, p = 0.6644. Performance standard treatment test if information about information about marginal 
cost (median) is equal to the median of the information about average cost, p = 0.0716. 
16 Mann-Whitney U-test, mean vs. mean: tax vs. subsidy treatment: p = 0.7574; tax vs. performance standard 
treatment: p = 0.0097; subsidy versus performance standard treatment: p = 0.0282. 
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across alternatives rather than the sum of abatement and compliance costs. (In the experiment, 
we explicitly instructed the subjects to choose the investment that resulted in the highest 
possible net revenue; see Appendix A6.) 
We hypothesize that subjects in the tax and subsidy treatments may have overweighted the 
impact of their own abatement costs, since these costs can be argued to be more salient than the 
compliance costs. The behavioral literature suggests a number of explanations and results 
showing similar biases as in our findings. Schkade and Kahneman (1998) find that subjects 
overestimate the impact of events that are more salient to them than other events. Amir, Ariely, 
and Carmon (2008) find an additional explanation—that price assessments focus on the features 
of the transaction cues (prices, costs, market norms, and so on). Hsee et al. (2003) suggest that 
attentional bias to various types of variables can lead to inconsistencies between choices and 
preferences. Further, the prominence effect may result in preference reversals, since choices 
become more informed by the most prominent attribute of evaluated alternatives (Tversky, 
Sattath, and Slovic 1988). Overall, these results show, in accordance with our study, that it is 
difficult to appropriately balance the importance of considerations that are the focus of attention 
with the importance of considerations that are currently in the background. 
C. Effects of bounded rationality and attentional biases 
To test whether attentional biases in information can provide an explanation for our observed 
investment choices, we apply a multinomial probit model to the full sample, with the investment 
choice as the dependent variable and stated relevance of the categories of information as 
independent variables. Exactly how bounded rationality enters the revealed choices is uncertain, 
as the subjects also bring their own aggregate of unmeasured and unmeasurable idiosyncrasies. 
The model accommodates this intrinsic heterogeneity by allowing the coefficients to vary 
across subjects. Elements of bounded rationality may then enter either as explained variation 
(here stated irrelevant information) or as errors if the model does not capture the explained 
variation due to bounded rationality. Table 3 contains the predicted probabilities and marginal 
effects of the multinomial probit model estimated on the full sample.17  
                                                            
17 We ran two tests with multinomial probit models. The first model used choice E (the rational choice) as base 
category and thereby showed whether a choice becomes more or less likely than choice E, which has a marginal 
cost equal to the tax (subsidy rate) in the treatments, as well as what information was used for making this 
choice. The second model used choice A as base category. The estimated coefficients of the two models are 
presented in Tables A.5.1 and A.5.2 in Appendix A.5. The predicted probabilities at means and the marginal 
effects shown in Table 3 are identical for the two models. 
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Table 3. Predicted probabilities and marginal effects on choice in the multinomial probit model 
Multinomial probit model       
Choice alternative A B C D E F 
Emissions performance  –0.025 –0.058 –0.101 –0.087 0.103 0.168 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.024) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) 
Total cost information 0.017  0.041  0.061 0.002  –0.042  –0.079  
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) 
Marginal cost information  0.022  –0.004  –0.003  –0.068 0.074 –0.021  
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.029) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Average cost information –0.026  0.009  0.021 0.181 –0.092 –0.093 
 (0.017 (0.021) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Predicted probability at means 0.040  0.078 0.159  0.247  0.232 0.244  
 (0.201) (0.027) (0.037) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) 
Prob > chi2  0.000       
       
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
The relevance of the emissions performance (EP) information is statistically significant at the 
5 or 10 percent level for all six investment choices. However, while the relevance of EP 
information is negatively correlated with choices A–D, it is positively correlated with 
investment choices E and F, indicating that a subject who stated EP as more relevant 
information had a higher probability of choosing E or F and a lower probability of choosing 
any of the choices A–D. 
The relevance of total cost (TC) information shows an almost opposite pattern. Subjects who 
stated TC as more relevant information have a lower probability of choosing F and a higher 
probability of choosing B or C. The relevance of marginal cost (MC) information has a 
significant positive effect on the probability of choosing E, consistent with standard economic 
theory. Finally, subjects indicating a higher relevance of average cost (AC) information have 
an 18 percentage point higher probability of choosing D. This is consistent with a choice rule 
that seeks to minimize AC across alternatives, and it is also the largest significant marginal 
effect across all alternative-specific information variables.18 
                                                            
18 To explicitly test the high coincidence of choosing D when AC has received high relevance, we test a binary 
probit model of a bounded rational choice rule in terms of a focal point at minimum average cost alternative 
using AC as relevant information (see Appendix A.5 and Table A.5.4). The model is significant in the tax 
treatment and in the overall sample model at the 10 percent significance level. 
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The means of the marginal costs in the observed choices across treatments span from 169 
SEK/kg (subsidy treatment) to 262 SEK/kg (performance standard treatment), to be compared 
with the 250 SEK/kg tax and subsidy level. The unique alternative with a marginal cost of 250 
SEK/kg, potentially the efficient choice in the tax and subsidy treatments by standard economic 
theory, was E. However, the largest explanatory factor for the differences between the means 
of observed marginal costs was that in the tax and subsidy treatments, alternative D was the 
most common choice (46 and 33 percent, respectively) among the subjects. The means of 
marginal costs in the tax and subsidy scenarios were 189 SEK/kg and 169 SEK/kg (standard 
deviations of 66.9 and 65.1), respectively, and thus considerably below the tax and subsidy 
level of 250 SEK/kg. On the other hand, the mean of the marginal cost in the performance 
standard treatment was 262 SEK/kg (standard deviation 50.8), significantly higher than the tax 
and subsidy level. 
D. Welfare implications 
Our experiment indicates that investment choices significantly deviate from the investment 
choice that equalizes firms’ marginal costs with the tax or subsidy level. It also shows that these 
deviations are smaller with performance standards than with (equally stringent) economic 
instruments. This can mainly be explained by the fact that subjects in the tax and subsidy 
treatments tended to choose the alternative that minimizes average abatement cost rather than 
the one that equalizes marginal cost with the tax or subsidy level. In welfare theory, this 
behavioral anomaly leads to a social loss the size of which is determined by the distance 
between the socially efficient tax level and the minimum of the average cost function. These 
two levels coincide in the special case where the marginal abatement benefit function and the 
marginal abatement cost function intersect at the minimum point of the average abatement cost 
function. However, depending on whether the intersection of the marginal benefit and the 
marginal cost functions lies to the right or the left of the minimum average cost, there will be 
too little or too much abatement compared with the socially efficient level and with what is cost 
efficient for the firm itself.  
In our experimental design, the minimum average cost was located on the right-hand side of 
the intersection of the marginal benefit and cost functions. In terms of welfare, the revealed 
attentional bias caused our subjects in the economic policy treatments to choose an abatement 
level that was too low compared with the socially efficient level. By analogy with the analysis 
of Weitzman (1974), the magnitude of this social loss depends on the relative slopes of the 
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marginal benefit and cost functions. In addition, bounded rationality in this case implies that 
firms systematically carry some losses. Overall, whether performance standards lead to higher 
cost efficiency within an industry compared with an economic instrument depends on how large 
the cost heterogeneity of available investment alternatives is compared with the variance of 
firms’ revealed marginal abatement costs due to behavioral anomalies in firms’ decisions. 
III. Concluding Remarks 
Economic policy instruments and performance standards inherently use and rely on different 
types of information variables. Consequently, firms’ decisions in response to policy will be 
informed by different types of information variables depending on the type of policy instrument. 
This study was designed to explore whether these inherent differences in provided information 
between economic instruments and performance standards can cause attentional and judgment 
biases, which in turn can lead to investment inefficiencies not predicted by economic theory. 
We analyzed the choice behavior of 164 experienced managers and investment advisors in 
Swedish industry who were presented with the task of maximizing net revenue from abatement 
investments under three different but equally stringent environmental policy regimes in a 
randomized artefactual field experiment.  
We found that the investment decisions made by managers and investment advisors, all of 
whom have experience with real investment decisions in response to these types of 
environmental policies in Sweden, are subject to investment inefficiencies and rarely use the 
choice rule consistent with standard economic theory. In particular, their investment choices 
were affected by the type of policy instrument. Specifically, inefficiencies were larger with 
economic instruments than with performance standards. These results were obtained even 
though the subjects’ attention to abatement costs and to the minimization of those costs was 
greater with economic instruments than with performance standards.  
Interestingly, we find that the most frequently used choice rule in the tax and subsidy treatments 
was consistent with a tendency to minimize costs over abatement alternatives rather than over 
abatement alternatives taking into account the tax or subsidy rate. Specifically, managers and 
senior advisors tended to minimize average abatement costs rather than the sum of abatement 
costs and regulatory costs, resulting in mean abatement levels with marginal costs significantly 
lower than the tax and subsidy levels. That is, subjects in the tax and subsidy treatments could 
have reduced costs further by increasing the abatement level, as the reduction in tax payments 
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(increase in subsidy earnings) would have more than compensated for the increase in 
investment costs. 
Our experimental results also indicate that performance standards may result in even larger total 
cost inefficiencies than predicted by standard economic theory because of underexploited cost 
heterogeneities within industry. Performance-based judgments in firms’ decision making may 
divert attention away from the monetary attributes required for fulfilling the cost efficiency part 
of constrained optimization under performance standards.  
We hypothesize that our results occur because the different policy instruments invoke 
differences in the decision-making process by drawing subjects’ attention to different types of 
information, resulting in attention and judgment biases that lead to investment inefficiencies 
not predicted by standard economic theory. Our results resemble findings in the theoretical and 
experimental literature in behavioral economics and psychology (we find evidence of similar 
information-type judgment biases in, e.g., Thaler 1985; Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic 1988; 
Schkade and Kahneman 1998; Hsee 1999; Hsee et al. 2003; Amir and Ariely 2007; Amir, 
Ariely, and Carmon 2008). 
The consequence of our results for social efficiency is analogous to the findings of Weitzman 
(1974), where misunderstandings of the optimal abatement level lead to social losses that 
depend on the type of policy instrument (in Weitzman’s case, price versus quantity instruments; 
in our case, price versus standards). Our findings suggest that it may not only be the regulator 
(due to asymmetric information) that causes social loss because of uncertainty about abatement 
costs when searching for the social optimal abatement level. Firms themselves may also make 
mistakes in their responses to policies, and the magnitude of these mistakes depends on the type 
of policy instrument and the shape of the abatement cost function.  
The prevalence of such effects presents a challenge to policy researchers as well as regulators 
in their choice and design of policy instruments. We conclude that the insights from behavioral 
and experimental economics as applied to firm manager behavior have so far been a neglected 
area. Future research should use rigorous empirical research and randomized field experiments 
to adequately estimate the effects of policy interventions on firm behavior. Future policy 
research should seek to fully understand both the effects and causes of bounded rationality 
among managers and address the challenges that such effects present to policy making in the 
choice and design of policy instruments. This should involve follow-up studies on combinations 
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of economic instruments and information that could better correct for bounded rationality 
among mangers.  
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A.1 Recruitment Process of Managers and Senior Advisors 
The target subjects, experienced managers, and senior advisors in environmental investment 
decisions were recruited from Swedish firms identified via the regulatory register of plants 
classified as performing environmentally hazardous activities (EHA) according to the Swedish 
Environmental Code.19 All EHA-registered plants in the chemical, paper and pulp, and steel 
sectors, as well as all combustion plants for production of electricity and heat in Sweden, were 
selected for the sample. Since the regulatory registry covers plants and not firms, the firms had 
to be identified by their ownership of the plants using the ownership data from the mandatory 
annual environmental reporting for 2012.  
The register of EHA-regulated plants led to a list of 385 firms operating plants within these 
categories. As the list includes some of the largest business concerns in Sweden, each owning 
several firms and production plants in different regions, the sample sometimes includes multiple 
firms belonging to the same business concern. Thus, two “firms” in the data may be owned by 
the same business concern, but in such a case they have different subjects, usually employed at 
firms in different regions of the country.  
The plants in the EHA category are, in general, large and regulated by a range of different policy 
instruments, including technology and performance standards by the Swedish Environmental 
Code and the EU environmental law, as well as economic policy instruments such as the 
Swedish NOx charge, the CO2 tax, and the European Union’s CO2 emissions trading system 
(EU ETS). Therefore, the managers and senior advisors have experience with investment 
decisions in response to several types of policy instruments. 
Typically, plant activities classified as EHA apply only to plants above a certain size, which is 
usually linked to production volume. For instance, plant activities in the steel industry are 
classified as EHA only if a plant’s annual production of iron or steel exceeds 5,000 tonnes, and 
a boiler is classified as EHA only if its thermal input exceeds 20 megawatts. The regulation’s 
conditions on size mean that our sample mainly represents medium-size to the largest firms and 








sample can therefore be considered as among the most experienced seniors in the Swedish 
industry, with an average age of 49 and working experience of 14 years. 
All 385 firms on the list were contacted by phone in the search for the manager or senior advisor 
in charge of environmental investment decisions. Each subject was informed about the 
questionnaire by hearing a standardized introduction and then asked for his or her participation. 
For the pilot study, 54 firms were randomly drawn from the 385 firms and contacted by phone. 
In total, target subjects in 36 firms were reached by phone during January 2014 and agreed to 
participate in the questionnaire. The subjects were informed that the link to the online 
questionnaire would be sent to their e-mail within 24 hours after the phone call. Of those who 
agreed to participate, 32 subjects (89 percent) responded to at least the first part of the online 
questionnaire, which included the experiment, and 23 subjects (64 percent) responded to all 
following questions. The subjects included in the pilot study were not sampled for the final 
experiment. 
For the final experiment, the remaining 331 firms or plants on the list were contacted by phone 
during February and March 2014. In 52 of these firms (16 percent), the target subjects were not 
reached after three phone calls (for reasons such as meetings, traveling, or parental leave). In 
34 firms (10 percent), target subjects were reached by phone, but they declined to participate 
after hearing the introduction during the phone call.  
Thus, in the final experiment, managers and investment advisors from 290 firms (148 males 
and 142 females) agreed to participate during the phone call. The subjects were informed that 
the link to the online questionnaire would be sent to their e-mail within 24 hours after the phone 
call. After up to three reminders by either phone or e-mail, the web statistics of the online 
questionnaire showed that 230 (79 percent) of the subjects had visited the webpage with the 
introduction to the questionnaire; 200 subjects (69 percent) had responded to at least the first 
part of the questionnaire, which included the experiment; and 164 subjects (57 percent) 
completed the full questionnaire with all the following questions. Each subject had spent an 
average of 15 minutes answering the full questionnaire, including the experiment. 
Out of the 164 full-responding subjects, 69 were managers with experience as the formal 
decision makers in their firms’ environmental investments. Among these managers, 39 were 
also members of the firm’s or the business concern’s senior management team. The remaining 
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95 subjects were senior advisors who prepared or analyzed technical and economic background 
information for their firms’ investment decisions. 
A.2 Formal Optimization Problems with Optimal Conditions in the Treatments 
The experiment was designed such that the stringency of the regulations was identical, in the 
sense that optimal conditions would be fulfilled for the same abatement level in each of the 
three treatments. The conditions and the corresponding abatement levels in all three treatments 
are identical as long as the subsidy rate S is set equal to the tax rate T, which occurs when the 
standards are set such that  in equations (1.1)–(3.2). 
A.2.1 Performance Standards Treatment 
In the performance treatment, the rational firm maximizes profit subject to the constraint 
. The Lagrangean for cost minimization (equal optimal conditions to net revenue 
maximization when production output is constant) is 
(1.1)  
where c is production costs, a is abatement, e is emissions performance, i is a firm, and λ is 





Thus, the rational firm first identifies which alternatives fulfill the constraint , and then 
chooses from this feasible set the alternative that has the lowest marginal cost (under the binding 
constraint) according to equations (1.1)–(1.5).  
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In the tax treatment, the rational firm should seek to maximize its net revenue after abatement 
costs and taxes. It solves the unconstrained problem 
(2.1)  
where c is production costs, a is abatement, e is emissions performance, and T is the Pigovian 
tax. The necessary and sufficient first-order conditions for a firm with positive output and 
abatement costs are 
(2.2)  
Thus, the rational firm should, according to equation (2.2), choose the alternative in which the 
marginal cost equals the tax rate.  
 
A.2.3 Subsidy Treatment 
In the subsidy treatment, a rational firm should seek to maximize its net revenue after abatement 
costs and taxes. It solves the unconstrained problem 
(3.1)  
where c is production costs, a is abatement, e is emissions, and S is the subsidy rate. The necessary 
and sufficient first-order conditions for a firm with positive output and abatement costs are 
(3.2)  
Thus, the rational firm should, according to equation (3.2), choose the alternative in which the 
marginal cost equals the subsidy rate S. Comparing equations (2.2) and (3.2) shows that the 
rational firm faces no reference dependence between taxes and subsidies due to differences in 
distributive effects. 
 
A.3 Background Characteristics 
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In this section, we present background characteristics of the subjects and compare them among 
treatments. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three treatments. Mean values 
and standard deviations (s.d.) for all subjects and by treatment are presented in Table A.2.1. 
Table A.2.1. Background characteristics of subjects 
 Treatments 
Background characteristics of subjects All  Tax Subsidy Performance 
standard 
No. of subjects 164 52 45 67 
Regulatory experience (6 = extensive 
experience, 1 = no experience) 
 Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) 
-taxes and fees 3.68 (1.46) 3.46 (1.51) 3.67 (1.33) 3.87 (1.51) 
-subsidies 2.28 (1.44) 2.15 (1.49) 2.31 (1.22) 2.36 (1.55) 
-environmental laws (miljöbalken) 4.86 (1.24) 4.52 (1.18) 5.16 (0.98) 4.93 (1.39) 
Percentage of subjects that have 
participated in an investment 
decision (related to reducing the firms’ 
environmental pressure) within the last 
10 years 
89.6 78.8 95.6 94.0 
Education: percentage of subjects 









Years of working experience 13.89 (8.7) 10.75 (7.08) 15.56 (8.92) 15.16 (9.16) 
Age of subjects (years)b 48.6 (8.7) 47.9 (7.33) 48.7 (9.3) 49.1 (9.3)  





The subjects overall have quite extensive regulatory experience with environmental laws, but 
they have less experience with taxes and fees and substantially less experience on average with 
subsidies. Almost all subjects have participated in an investment decision related to reducing 
the firm’s environmental pressure, but this share is on average lower for the subjects in the tax 
treatment. The subjects are well educated, and over 80 percent in all treatments have a university 
degree. The average length of working experience for all subjects is approximately 14 years 
(however, it is a little higher for the subjects allocated to the subsidy and performance standard 
treatments compared with the tax treatment). The average age of the subjects is 48.6 years, and 
approximately half of the subjects are female (this differs among treatments, however, and the 
share of males is almost 60 percent in the performance standard treatment). 
Our testing reveals no statistically significant differences among the groups of subjects allotted 
to the three treatments regarding experience with taxes, fees, or subsidies; education; age; or 
gender. While we do not find any statistically significant differences in background 
characteristics between subjects in the subsidy and performance standard treatments, we do find 
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differences in the background characteristics of the group of subjects allotted to the tax 
treatment. Our results suggest that there is a statistically significant difference between the 
underlying distributions of the regulatory experience with environmental laws between the 
subjects in the tax and subsidy treatments (Mann-Whitney U-test, mean vs. mean, p = 0.0050) 
and between the subjects in the tax and performance standard treatments (Mann-Whitney U-
test, mean vs. mean, p = 0.0184). The subjects in both the subsidy treatment and the 
performance standard treatment have more extensive experience than expected compared with 
the null hypothesis, while the subjects in the tax treatment have less experience.  
We also find a statistically significant difference in the subjects’ mean experience with 
participating in investment decisions among the three different treatments (Pearson chi2(2), p = 
0.008). Comparing only two treatments at a time shows that there is no significant difference 
between subjects in the subsidy and performance standard treatment, but again the subjects in 
the tax treatment differ (in terms of participation in investment decisions) compared with both 
the subsidy treatment (Pearson chi2(2), p = 0.016) and the performance standard treatment 
(Pearson chi2(2), p = 0.013). The subjects in the tax treatment have less experience with 
participating in an investment decision than those in the subsidy and performance standard 
treatments. 
Years of working experience follows the same pattern as for regulatory experience and 
experience of participation in investment decisions: the results suggest that there is a 
statistically significant difference in the underlying distributions of years of working experience 
between subjects in the tax treatment and subsidy treatment (Mann-Whitney U-test, mean vs. 
mean, p = 0.0052), as well as between subjects in the tax treatment and performance standard 
treatment (Mann-Whitney U-test, mean vs. mean, p = 0.0089). The subjects in the subsidy 
treatment and the performance standard treatment have more working experience than expected 
compared with the null hypothesis, and subjects in the tax treatment have less experience. 
A.4 Summary Statistics on Investments and Stated Information per Treatment 
Tables A.4.1–A.4.3 show the number of observed choices, frequencies, and means across 
treatments. 
Table A.4.1. Performance standard treatment summary statistics 
Choices A B C D E F Average 
Observed choices 1 1 3 3 27 32 5.24 
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Percentage observed choices 1.49 1.49 4.48 4.48 40.30 47.76  
Average response time 
(seconds) 
51 174 236 177 306 162 242 
Stated relevant information        
Emissions performance  1.00 3.00 5.00 4.33 5.63 5.63 5.43 
Total annual investment cost 1.00 5.00 5.33 4.00 4.48 3.97 4.21 
Marginal cost of abatement 1.00 3.00 3.33 3.67 3.63 3.13 3.33 
Average cost of abatement 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.33 3.70 3.41 3.60 
 
Table A.4.2. Tax treatment summary statistics 
Choices A B C D E F Average 
Observed choices 3 5 10 24 2 8 3.79 
Percentage observed choices 5.77 9.62 19.23 46.15 3.85 15.38  
Average response time 
(seconds) 
301 269 355 360 966 354 369 
Stated relevant information        
Emissions performance  2.33 2.80 3.60 3.83 5.00 5.50 3.90 
Total annual investment cost 4.33 4.60 4.50 4.25 4.50 4.38 4.37 
Marginal cost of abatement 5.33 3.80 4.10 3.88 5.50 3.50 4.00 
Average cost of abatement 2.33 4.20 4.50 5.29 5.00 4.38 4.71 
 
Table A.4.3. Subsidy treatment summary statistics 
Choices A B C D E F Average 
Observed choices 4 7 12 15 4 3 3.38 
Percentage observed choices 8.89 15.56 26.67 33.33 8.89 6.67  
Average response time 
(seconds) 
268 294 655 383 497 681 462 
Stated relevant information        
Emissions performance  4.25 4.00 3.33 4.47 3.5 6.00 4.09 
Total annual investment cost 5.25 4.57 4.25 4.20 4.00 5.33 4.42 
Marginal cost of abatement 4.50 4.29 4.00 3.53 4.75 3.00 3.93 
Average cost of abatement 5.00 4.86 4.75 5.07 5.75 4.00 4.93 
 
Table A.4.5 shows the share of top ranks that each information variable received by each choice 







Table A.4.5. Frequencies of top-ranked stated information per choice 
Choice Stated 
information 
Extreme points in 
experimental design 
Revealed choice and stated information 










A  Performance Minimum performance Minimize performance across alternatives 25 20 0 
  TC Minimum TC Minimize TC across alternatives 25 30 25 
  AC Maximum AC Maximize AC across alternatives 25 30 0 
  MC Minimum MC Minimize MC across alternatives 25 20 75 
B Performance No extreme performance Compromise performance across alternatives 0 15 13 
  TC No extreme TC Compromise TC across alternatives 100 23 38 
  AC No extreme AC Compromise AC across alternatives 0 38 25 
  MC AC=tax and subsidy Rational choice based on AC information 0 23 25 
C Performance No extreme performance Compromise performance across alternatives 40 15 19 
  TC No extreme TC Compromise TC across alternatives 60 31 33 
  AC No extreme AC Compromise AC across alternatives 0 35 29 
  MC No extreme MC Compromise MC across alternatives 0 19 19 
D Performance No extreme performance Compromise performance across alternatives 17 23 15 
  TC No extreme TC Compromise TC across alternatives 17 29 18 
  AC Minimum AC Minimize AC across alternatives 50 35 55 
  MC No extreme MC Compromise MC across alternatives 17 13 12 
E Performance Performance = standards Fulfill standards (or compromise performance) 65 14 20 
  TC No extreme TC Compromise TC across alternatives 20 14 20 
  AC No extreme AC Compromise AC across alternatives 8 43 20 
  MC MC = tax and subsidy Rational choice based on MC information 8 29 40 
 F Performance Maximum performance Maximize performance (or fulfill with certainty) 67 60 55 
  TC Maximum TC Maximize TC across alternatives 14 40 27 
  AC No extreme AC Compromise AC across alternatives 7 0 9 
  MC Maximum MC Maximize MC across alternatives 12 0 9 
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A.5 Multinomial Probit Model Estimation Results 
Table A.5.1. Multinomial probit all base E (rational choice) as comparison 
Multinomial probit model       
Choice alternative A B C D E F 
Emissions performance  –0.645  –0.746 –0.733  –0.566  BASE 0.179  
 (0.175) (0.201) (0.166) (0.165)  (0.190) 
Total cost information 0.354  0.432  0.381  0.136  BASE  –0.103  
 (0.210) (0.218) (0.168) (0.150)  (0.132) 
Marginal cost information  0.564  –0.255  –0.237  –0.422  BASE  –0.278  
 (0.293) (0.213) (0.189) (0.186)  (0.187) 
Average cost information –0.503  0.345  0.368 0.810 BASE  0.102  
 (0.285) (0.200) (0.188) (0.202)  (0.169) 
Prob > chi2  0.000       
       
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table A.5.2. Multinomial probit all base A as comparison 
Multinomial probit model       
Choice alternative A B C D E F 
Emissions performance  BASE –0.101  –0.088  0.078  0.645 0.824 
  (0.178) (0.149) (0.149) (0.175) (0.206) 
Total cost information BASE  0.078  0.027  –0.219  –0.354 –0.457 
  (0.242) (0.216) (0.210) (0.210) (0.217) 
Marginal cost information  BASE  –0.311  –0.294  –0.479 –0.056 –0.343 
  (0.287) (0.277) (0.282) (0.293) (0.295) 
Average cost information BASE  0.395  0.419 0.860  0.050 0.061 
  (0.268) (0.262) (0.279) (0.285) (0.279) 
Prob > chi2  0.000       
       





Table A.5.3. Probit model estimation results 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Choice alternative A B C D E F 
Emissions information –0.237 –0.288 –0.304 –0.177 0.294 0.480 
 (0.099) (0.103) (0.078) (0.072) (0.103) (0.127) 
Investment cost information 0.137 0.208 0.188* –0.024 –0.041 –0.186 
 (0.128) (0.131) (0.105) (0.094) (0.089) (0.092) 
Marginal cost information 0.254 –0.00133 0.017 –0.202 0.244 –0.060 
 (0.202) (0.115) (0.094) (0.091) (0.116) (0.104) 
Average cost information –0.289 0.0213 0.054 0.549 –0.182 –0.214 
 (0.196) (0.096) (0.085) (0.100) (0.104) (0.093) 
Constant –1.099 –1.225 –0.866 –1.541 –2.236 –1.086 
 (1.101) (0.838) (0.677) (0.618) (0.803) (0.905) 
Pseudo R2 0.191 0.105 0.103 0.194 0.102 0.242 
N 164 164 164 164 164 164 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table A.5.4. Probit model (choice D = 1) with average information  
Probit model (D = 1)        
Choice alternative Tax Subsidy Standards All   
Average cost information 0.547 0.114 0.674 0.491   
 (0.172) (0.181) (0.413) (0.101)   
Constant       
       
Prob > chi2 0.001 0.531 0.103 0.000   
       
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table A.5.5. Probit model (choice E = 1) with marginal cost information  
Probit model (D = 1)        
Choice alternative Tax Subsidy Standards All   
Marginal cost information 0.792 0.309 0.183 0.070   
 (0.408) (0.259) (0.119) (0.084)   
Constant       
       
Prob > chi2 0.052 0.234 0.122 0.404   
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Total annual investment cost (SEK) 21,250 25,000 31,250 40,000 51,250 65,000 
Marginal cost of abatement (SEK/kg) 50 100 150 200 250 300 
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A.7 Monetary Incentives: Cinema Tickets 
The subjects were informed that after submitting the questionnaire, they would receive a gift 
card (cinema tickets) sent via e-mail (see Appendix A.6). The value of the gift card (number of 
cinema tickets) was stated to be determined by the total cost that resulted from the investment 
option selected by the subject. The higher the net return from the investment, the larger the 
value of the gift card (the subjects were informed that the value would vary between SEK 100 
and SEK 300). The price of a cinema ticket in Sweden (without any discounts) is 120–130 SEK, 
and the subjects were paid either one or two tickets. Subjects that chose alternative E containing 
the optimal condition that the marginal abatement cost is equal to the tax (or subsidy) rate in 
the economic instrument treatments and the minimum costs in the constrained optimization of 
the performance standard treatment—earned two cinema tickets, while all other subjects, 
regardless of choice, earned one ticket. The cinema tickets were sent out to the subjects via e-
mail. There is one large cinema chain in Sweden called SF (www.sf.se), and the cinema tickets 
were valid in cinema theaters all across the country. SF provided an individual code for each 
ticket and a digital ticket (see below), which were attached to the e-mail sent out to each subject. 
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